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Abstract:  This paper studies whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural 
protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994).  This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural 
data. We test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, 
subsidies, and PAC contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the 
data. We make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model’s quantitative implications, 
also found in recent studies.  This solution makes the simple model consistent with the 
complicated decision-making process in real world government.  The results imply the 




World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3819, January 2006 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if 
the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited 
accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the 
authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries 




*Helen and Roy Ryu Professor of International Affairs, Bush School of Government. Texas A&M 
University, College Station, TX 77843-4220. Email: kgawande@tamu.edu.  Phone: (979) 458-8034.   
 
We thank Marcelo Olarreaga for access to valuable data on agricultural protection and subsidies. The 























































































































1.    Introduction 
Total support to agriculture in the OECD has remained steady at some US$300 billion per year.  
Two-thirds of this amount is generated by instruments that support domestic prices, especially 
border protection, and one-third by direct fiscal subsidies. The incidence of the former is mostly 
borne by domestic consumers, while the costs of the latter are incurred by taxpayers. Tariffs in 
agriculture are many times those applied to manufactures.  The use of nontariff measures is as 
prolific in agriculture as it has become in manufacturing.  
 
Understanding the political economy of agricultural support policies in OECD countries is 
important for those who foot the bill.  Adoption of more efficient policy instruments to achieve 
agricultural objectives requires a good understanding of who is gaining from the status quo. It is 
also important in order to effectively negotiate in a multilateral forum, so that opposing sets of 
countries can identify policy packages that can mobilize domestic political support for reforms.  
de Gorter and Swinnen motivate the study of the political economy of agricultural policy as: 
“Understanding why governments do as they do allows one to analyze the policy formation 
process and alter incentive constraints through institutional reform in order to achieve desired 
policy outcomes”.
1 To this hopeful end, this paper employs a structural approach to 
understanding the political economy of U.S. agricultural protection. 
 
The approach is very much based on the notion that governments trade off their own personal 
interests with the costs that their policies impose on society. Thus, lobbying by special interests 
is intrinsic to the theory. While previous empirical studies find associations between special 
interests and agricultural protection, they lack the discipline imposed by theory on their empirical 
models. A primary objective of this paper is to undertake a theoretically motivated empirical 
analysis of agricultural protection.  We employ the Grossman-Helpman political economy model 
to investigate whether agricultural protection is a consequence of political campaign 
contributions.
2  This model has come into prominence with the advent of empirical work 
                                                 
1 de Gorter and Swinnen (2002, p. 1903). 
 




endorsing its predictions, at least qualitatively.
3  The model predicts protection to be a simple 
function of the existence of lobbying organization, the inverse of the import-to-output and 
export-to-output ratios and the import demand and export supply elasticities.  The tightness of its 
theoretical predictions make the model amenable to testing using cross-sectional data.  We apply 
the Grossman-Helpman model to the case of US agricultural trade policy, using precise measures 
of lobbying organization and agricultural protection and subsidies to a cross section of 
agricultural commodities from the late 1990s. To our knowledge this is the first study to use 
agriculture data to test the Grossman-Helpman model.  It is also the first to seriously consider 
subsidies within the Grossman-Helpman framework. 
 
We go beyond previous empirical studies of the Grossman-Helpman model as well. We would 
expect a government that is influenced by contributions to trade off consumer welfare loss for 
contribution dollars on an about equal basis.  However, previous studies indicate that the US 
government is actually a welfare lover and places almost negligible weight on contributions.  
This paper suggests a novel resolution for that puzzle.  We show that it is the consequence of 
taking a feature of the theory all too literally. Doing away with the “unitary” government 
assumption and introducing policy uncertainty, that is, making the model more real-worldly, rids 
the paradox.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the literature.  It emphasizes the 
difference between the reduced form methods traditionally used in the agriculture protection 
literature and the structural method implemented in this paper.  In Section 3 the Grossman-
Helpman model is introduced and its main predictions stated and described. The data are 
described in Section 4.  The data are new and theoretically appropriate for testing the model. In 
Section 5 the model’s prediction is tested and the results analyzed.  A puzzle posed by this and 





                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 Eicher and Osang 2002, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Mitra, 




2.  The first-generation literature  
A number of authors have advanced extensions of the pressure group model building on a 
combination of the Olson-Stigler-Downs model.
4 Empirical evidence concerning the 
determinants of the structure of agricultural protection is plentiful.  Two studies provide a flavor 
for the results. Olper estimates a reduced form econometric model of Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) transfers.
5  His results indicate that protection is positively correlated with adverse 
market conditions (supporting the counter-cyclicality hypotheses of Bullock), inversely 
correlated with comparative disadvantage (supporting the Stolper-Samuelson effects that 
motivate losers to organize politically to oppose liberalization), and inversely correlated with 
high budget shares devoted to food consumption (perhaps indicating government’s concern for 
welfare losses from protection).  Honma applies the well known Anderson-Hayami framework to 
a panel of 14 industrial countries between 1955-1987 to find that protection is inversely 
correlated with high productivity (relative to industry) in agriculture and positively correlated 
with a decline in the terms of trade in agriculture.
6   
 
While this “first generation” of empirical studies conveys the message about the endogeneity of 
protection in agriculture, the empirical specifications they employ are ad hoc, with tenuous links 
to underlying theory.  While they find strong associations of agricultural price distortions with 
some variables, the reduced form models cannot distinguish between competing theories. What 
theory are the results informing? Which theory should serve as the lens for best viewing the 
world of agricultural protection? This paper is motivated by the need in the literature to begin 
second-generation work that is more theory-based and less ad hoc than the studies that led the 
way.  The Grossman-Helpman model has the potential to become the dominant theoretical 
paradigm in the international economics literature as it offers a consistent and rigorous 
framework that integrates a number of the economic and political variables that motivated the 
                                                 
4 Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Downs (1957).  See also de Gorter and Tsur (1991).  de Gorter and 
Swinnen (2002) provide the most up to date survey of this literature.   
 
5 Olper (1998). 
 
6 Honma (1993), Anderson and Hayami (1986). These findings also support Anderson’s (1982) 
hypothesis that contraction of the agricultural sector reduces consumers’ resistance to agricultural 





first generation political economy models (and rejects others). Since this model is inspired by the 
political system prevalent in the United States, it is particularly well suited to be applied to U.S. 
agricultural protection.   
 
This paper thus departs in two important ways from previous empirical work. First, we employ a 
structural  approach, where the empirical model is tightly linked with the theory. Second, rather 
than employing approximate measures of protection, we use ad valorem equivalents of protective 
instruments, just as the theory demands it.
7  The structural model allows a symmetric treatment 
of subsidies as well as protection.  This feature of the theory is attractive for a study of 
agriculture, a sector in which a variety of protection and subsidy instruments are used.  We 
exploit this to test a complete version of the Grossman-Helpman model.  
 
 
3.  The Grossman-Helpman Model  
The Grossman-Helpman general equilibrium theory of how trade policy responds to lobbying 
contributions delivers a precise prediction about the cross-sectional structure of tariffs and 
subsidies.
8 In their model, money causes votes and is the source of electoral strength. A fact that 
supports this view is that lobbying contributions account for a significant share, up to 80%, of the 
total campaign expenditures of the majority of congresspersons.
9   
 
A unitary government is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of welfare (W) and lobbying 
contributions (C): 
 
                                                 
7  Traditionally, protection is measured by the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) which measures the 
difference between world and domestic prices as a result of the protection support, or the effective 
protection coefficient (EPC) which measures the amount by which protection raises value added, or 
producer/ consumer subsidy equivalent (PSE, CSE) which measures the monetary benefit to 
producers/consumers as a percentage of production value in the absence of protection.  We use ad 
valorem equivalents of tariffs and NTMs, which are more appropriate for the theory. 
 
8  Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
 
9  Authors own observations from perusing a number of congressional profiles between 1980 and 2000 





G = aW+C,            ( 1 )  
 
where a is the weight the government puts on a dollar of welfare relative to a dollar of 
contributions.
10  Free trade would be the efficient outcome if the government maximized welfare 
alone. Here government trades off welfare loss imposed on consumers by its policies for 
campaign contributions by those who stand to gain from those policies.  The parameter a 
determines the terms of this tradeoff.  
 
First, consider producers of good i that compete with imports. An ad valorem import tariff ti on 
good i raises its price pi above the world market price
W
i p . Revenues from the tariff are 
redistributed on a lump-sum basis to individuals in the economy. These individuals differ only in 
their ownership of sector-specific factors. Each individual owns capital that is specific to the 
production of one good.  The supply of any sector-specific capital is limited, hence the rewards 
to specific capital used to produce good i increase with pi.  This provides owners of sector-
specific capital in any import-competing sector an incentive to politically organize and lobby the 
government for a tariff.
11  
 
Now consider producers of good i that export to the rest of the world. An ad valorem export 
subsidy si on good i raises its price pi above the world market price
W
i p . The costs of the subsidy 
are collected on a lump-sum basis from individuals in the economy. Symmetric to the import-
                                                 
10  While the political science literature has debated and gone beyond unitary government theories, 
formally complete models with more sophisticated forms of government are rare.  The unitary 
government construct may be at the heart of why quantitative implications of empirical studies of the 
Grossman-Helpman model make the government out to be welfare maximizers even though this is 
inconsistent with the data. We return to this issue in the discussion of the empirical results, and offer a 
resolution that features congressional decision-making.   
 
11 Cross-commodity linkages are absent from the model, so that organized producers lobby only for 
protection to their good, not against protection on other goods.  Consumers are the only group hurt by the 
tariffs. The relatively small input-output coefficients among the set of agricultural goods indicates that 
this assumption is well worth making for agricultural goods, and simplifies the model considerably. 
Cross-commodity linkages can be theoretically accommodated but introducing competition among 
lobbies makes the predictions less simple.  Lopez (2001) studies cross-commodity linkages using a 





competing case, owners of sector-specific capital in exporting sectors have an incentive to 
politically organize and lobby the government for a subsidy. 
 
Suppose that sector i is an import-competing sector (the analysis for an exporting sector is 
symmetric). The lobby representing import-competing producers of good i presents government 
a menu that indicates the monetary contribution the lobby promises to make for each and every 
possible tariff ti.
12  The menu may obviously offer zero contributions for some values of the tariff 
(resp. subsidy).  What considerations go into determining the menu? The lobby must recognize 
that the government maximizes (1), in particular that government is concerned about the 
collective welfare of consumers. Consider the extreme example of just one lobby (in order to 
abstract from lobbying competition) which exists, say, in sector 1, and whose membership is 
negligible relative to the population.  Lobby 1 competes with imports and in order to induce the 
government to protect it, the lobby submits a menu of offers matching a money contribution to 
every possible tariff.  This menu is its contribution schedule C1(t1).  The government can choose 
protect this sector with a tariff that raises p1 above the world price and collect the contribution 
associated with that tariff level (promised in the menu), or ignore the lobby and collect nothing 
from it.  If the value of the political welfare function (1) with a zero tariff on good 1 equals G0, 
then in order to obtain a more favorable policy, lobby 1 must ensure the government its status 
quo welfare of at least G0.  That is, it must compensate the government to the extent of the 
welfare loss from protecting sector 1.
13  From (1), it is evident that in order for government’s 
welfare to remain unchanged, the contribution C1(t1) for a tariff of t1 must equal −a∆W, where 
∆W is the change in the population’s welfare due to the deadweight loss from the tariff.  
 
We proceed by making the simplifying assumption that the politically organized population is a 
negligible fraction of the country’s total population.  The assumption is approximately satisfied 
                                                 
12 Formally, the menu is the set of contributions } , , 1 ), ( { ∞ = K j t C
j
i i  that maps each and every possible 
tariff for good i into a dollar contribution. 
 
13 In this example, the single lobby gets to keep any and all surplus (the aggregate change in the welfare 
of each member net of contributions). When there is more than one lobby, due to the competition from 
other lobbies, they may be forced to collectively contribute beyond the welfare loss to the government.  In 





for the U.S. agriculture sector that we empirically consider in the paper. The corresponding 
predictions without this assumption are provided in accompanying footnotes.  The assumption 
simplifies the main testable implication of the model in a manner that has both intuitive and 
empirical appeal. With the contribution schedules of the organized sectors in hand, the 


























































,  if i’s  producers  export.      (2) 
 
In (2) ti is the ad valorem tariff on imports of good i  and si  is the ad valorem subsidy on good i 
in political equilibrium. Ii is an indicator variable that equals one if producers in sector i are 
politically organized into a (import-competing or exporting) lobby. a>0 is the government 
preference parameter.   i i
M
i m y z / =  is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports and 
M
i e  is the  absolute elasticity of import demand.
15  i i
X
i x y z / =  is the equilibrium ratio of 
domestic output to exports and 
X
i e  is the  elasticity of export supply.  If good i is imported it is 
                                                 
14  In order to formally derive (2) it is easiest to use the Goldberg-Maggi bargaining game approach.  
Consider an import-competing sector i. The equilibrium tariff in sector i results from the maximization of 
the joint government-lobby (net) welfare function G+Wi− Ci where Wi− Ci is the welfare of lobby i net of 
its contributions. When the proportion of organized specific factor owners (in all sectors) is negligible in 
the population, the welfare of lobby i is simply the profits in sector i, or πi. Profit in sector i is a function 
of the sector i tariff ti. The joint government-lobby (in sector i) welfare is aW + Wi, where W the country’s 
welfare (W is the sum of economy-wide wage income, profits, tariff revenue, and consumer surplus -- the 
latter three being functions of tariffs).  Applying the first order condition for a maximum to the joint net 
welfare, and noting that the lobbies in other sectors are too small to influence tariffs outside their own 
sectors, determines the optimal political-economic tariff in sector i as the first equation in (2).  A 
symmetric derivation for exporting sectors determines the optimal export subsidy according to the second 
equation in (2). 
 
15 Thus, the logic of Ramsey pricing applies. If the demand for a good is uniformly less elastic than that 
for another good, the optimal tax rate is higher for the first good due to the lower deadweight loss from 
taxing it rather than the second good. If the first good is totally inelastic there is no deadweight loss from 
taxing it, and the first best can be reached by taxing just this good. 




protected (ti>0) if it is politically represented by a lobby (Ii=1) but not otherwise (Ii=0); if good i 
is exported it is subsidized (si>0) if it is politically represented by a lobby but not otherwise. 
 
The right hand side of (2) indicates that protection to organized sectors is given according to 
their z/e ratios. Since the deadweight loss from protection (resp. subsidies) increases with the 
absolute import demand (export supply) elasticities, the tariff (subsidy) varies inversely with 
elasticities, all else equal.  The numerator of z, that is, output, formalizes the notion of the stakes 
from protection and subsidies. Thus, contributions, and consequently protection/subsidies, vary 
directly with output.  Finally, the lower the denominator of z (imports or exports), the lower the 
social cost that a tariff or subsidy imposes on the population, making the government more 
amenable to distorting prices in those sectors.
16 
 
Equation (2) presents a precise and testable implication about the cross-sector pattern of 
protection and subsidies, and forms the basis for testing the Grossman-Helpman model. The 
tightness of the theoretical prediction makes it possible to measure the key political economy 
parameter a.  The qualitative test of the model is that the coefficient on (Ii×zi/ei) is positive. 
                                                 
16 The corresponding expressions without making the assumption that the number of lobby members are a 

























































































,  if i’s producers export.    (2)′ 
 
The new parameter α is the fraction of the population organized into lobbies, and measures the extent of 
opposition to protection. The first component on the right hand side of (2) indicates that negative 
protection to unorganized industries is given according to their z/e ratios. This is because domestic 
consumers of that good (other than producers of the good) oppose protecting or subsidizing it since that 
raises the domestic price of the good. To the extent such consumers are politically organized they will 
lobby against protecting or subsidizing it.  This component is less relevant for agricultural goods for the 
reason that if only a negligible fraction of consumers of agricultural goods were organized into lobbies 
(α=0), there would be no organized opposition to protecting any sector, only organized support for 
protecting a lobby’s own sector.  Since the proportion of income spent on food is small in advanced 
countries, there is little if any counter-lobbying by end consumers. Firms in food processing that use 
agricultural goods as intermediate inputs, who would normally oppose protection to agriculture, have 
chosen instead to lobby the government for protection to their sector. Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu 
(2002) pay careful attention to issues relating to the estimation of the parameters a and α, and discuss how 




Inverting the coefficient yields an estimate of a. The quantitative test of the model is whether 
these estimates of a are reasonable. 
 
Empirical testing of the Grossman-Helpman model using nontariff barrier (NTB) data from the 
1980s in U.S. manufacturing has been undertaken in two studies, by Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay, and Goldberg and Maggi.
17 Since U.S tariff reductions were the subject of 
multilateral reductions in the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds, while the Grossman-Helpman model 
is one of unilateral protection, NTBs are more appropriate for testing the model.  NTBs are 
measured as coverage ratios, that is, the percentage of imports covered by such barriers.  Both 
studies qualitatively affirm the Grossman-Helpman model prediction. They find that protection 
increases with the inverse import-to-output ratio in politically organized industries (as measured 
by existence of PACs).
18 However, they find the implied value of the government preference 
parameter a to be surprisingly high – over 100 in the Goldberg-Maggi study and over 1000 in the 
Gawande-Bandyopadhyay study.  If those estimates were taken literally, then the U.S. 
government would approximate the textbook ideal of welfare-maximizing entities!   
 
                                                 
17 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999). 
 
18 Gardner’s (1987) study is prescient about the Grossman-Helpman model’s key features.  In Gardner’s 
model government maximizes the weighted sum of buyer’s surplus (B) and producer’s rents (R), B + θR. 
In turn, B and R are functions of farm output quantities. Efficient redistribution using production controls 
in this framework requires choosing quantities of farm products to maximize W.  Unlike Grossman and 
Helpman, who adopt a formal model of the lobbying process and, as a result, are able to provide micro-
foundations for their objective function, Gardner does not provide micro-foundations for W.  He employs 
Peltzman’s (1976) “majority generating function” as the argument for using this type of objective 
function.  He attributes the same forces that determine lobbying effectiveness as determining the value of 
the parameter θ.  Gardner measures these forces for seventeen farm commodity by the number of 
producers, their geographical dispersion, the stakes from redistribution (output per farm), and the stability 
of the industry (variability of production patterns).  He also estimates (long-run) demand and supply 
elasticities for those commodities. Pooling data across the seventeen commodities over the period 1912-
80 yields a sample of 1124 observations for Gardner’s empirical analysis.  The dependent variables are 
variants of the nominal protection coefficient.  Gardner finds that the lower (greater) the (inverse) demand 
elasticity, the greater the level of intervention, that is, the higher the price relative to it’s non-distorted 
price.  This is a confirmation of the Grossman-Helpman intuition that it is most efficient to tax 
commodities with the lowest price elasticities of demand, and is the basis for Gardner’s conclusion that 





The empirical work of Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu, and McCalman are notable for taking 
the theory to data outside the U.S.
19  While they affirm the model’s prediction, they too find an 
implausibly high implied value of the government preference parameter a.  In both Turkey 
(Mitra et al.) and Australia (McCalman), governments attach more than 50 times as much weight 
on aggregate welfare as on contributions. This is grossly inconsistent with large deadweight 
losses that protection imposes on consumers as a number of U.S. case studies of protection 
demonstrate.
20 Do agricultural protection data yield similar results?  
 
Agricultural data allow us to add new features to the empirical testing of the Grossman-Helpman 
model, and thus significantly differentiate this study from the studies cited above and other 
forthcoming works. We are able to incorporate the use of subsidies into the model because they 
are pervasive in agriculture but rare in U.S. manufacturing.  The pooling of both equations in (2) 
into one model is a unique feature of the paper.  We also consider the two equations separately. 
We estimate three cross-sectional econometric models based on stochastic versions of equation 

















































, if  i’s  producers  export.    (3) 
 
In (3) εi is an identically independently distributed normal homoskedastic error term, which 
specifies the data generating process for the dependent variables. This model is estimated for the 
full sample of imported and exported goods.  The model may be written with both equations 
stacked into a single equation with the terms redefined as: 
 
                                                 
19 Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) and McCalman (2002). 
 
20 See e.g. Hufbauer, et al. (1986) and de Melo and Tarr (1990). Gawande and Krishna’s (2004) survey 























,          ( 4 )  
 
where gi = ti and  M
i
M
i i i e z e z / / =  if i is an imported good, and gi = si and  X
i
X
i i i e z e z / / =  if i 
is an exported good.  Data on protection and subsidies from 1998 are used to estimate this model 
across a cross-section of agricultural goods. The parameter of interest a is recovered as the 
inverse of the estimate of the coefficient β1.  
  
Concern about the endogeneity of the regressor compels using the appropriate methodology.  
Quite clearly, import penetration (inverse of z
M) is influenced by protection and the export-to-
output ratio (inverse of z
X) is influenced by subsidies.  Further, which sectors are capable of 
organizing politically is also influenced in part by their expectation of the degree to which they 
will benefit from tariffs and subsidies.  Thus, the regressor Ii . zi /ei is a nonlinear transformation 
(here product) of two endogenous variables, and is therefore itself endogenous.  In order to 
estimate the coefficient β1 consistently we construct exogenous variables capable of 
instrumenting the component endogenous variables, and then use the method of Kelejian to 
instrument the composite regressor.
21  The Kelejian method simply requires us to use not only 
the instruments linearly, but their higher order terms (quadratic, cross-products) as well.   
 
Constructing instruments for the agricultural data is a nontrivial task due to paucity of data on 
variables that are truly exogenous.  Testing the exogeneity of instruments is thus necessary.  
Even if instruments pass the test of exogeneity, it is prudent to investigate whether the 
instruments are “weakly” related to the endogenous regressor. If so, then it seriously affects 
inferences that may be made from small samples.  An important literature has grown around this 
subject in recent years in response to strong concerns about the endogeneity problem in natural 
experiments.
22  These studies and others indicate that the first-stage F-statistic may be used to 
assess whether a weak instrument problem exists.  If a weak instrument problem exists, the 
popularly used two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator can suffer a possibly intolerable level of 
                                                 
21 Kelejian (1971). 
 




bias.  On the other hand, the limited information likelihood estimator (LIML) is a better-quality 
estimator and is more robust to the weak instrument problem.  We report both the 2SLS and 
LIML results.  
  
In addition to model (4) we also estimate two models for separate samples of imported goods and 

























,          ( 5 )  
 

























.          ( 6 )  
 
Whereas in model (4) it is assumed that government’s policy preferences are constant regardless 
of whether their decision is about protection or about subsidies, (5) and (6) allow flexibility in 
this regard. Before turning to the task of testing the model, we discuss the data.   
 
 
4.   Data 
 
Protection 
The data on protection and subsidies we use are not only comprehensive in the range of 
instruments they cover, but are measured in a manner that fit the theoretical requirement of the 
model.
23  They have been constructed as part of a World Bank project on trade restrictiveness. 
We use three measures of protection and two measures of subsidies produced by those studies.  
The first measure of protection is the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of core nontariff measures 
                                                 
23 We are grateful to Marcelo Olarreaga for access to this and other data that were constructed as part of 





(Core NTMs) for each HS six-digit tariff line item estimated by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga.
24 
AVEs of core NTMs
25 (price and quantity control measures, technical regulations, as well as 
monopolistic measures, such as single channel for imports) are computed by Kee et al. using 
Leamer’s comparative advantage approach.
26  
 
The second is an all-encompassing measure of protection, Overall Protection, which is the sum 
of all three possible sources of protection: tariffs, NTMs and domestic subsidies in agriculture.
27  
Since they are measured as ad valorem equivalents, they are summed to yield an overall measure 
of protection.  
 
The third is a complete tariff measure, All Tariff, which combines ad valorem tariffs with (ad 
valorem equivalents of) specific tariffs.
28  Both measures have been historically prevalent in 
agriculture, and since agriculture was untouched by the multilateral rounds of negotiations 
                                                 
24 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004b). 
 
25 Core NTMs include quantitative restrictions, price control measures, monopolistic measures and 
technical regulations corresponding to codes 6000, 8000, 7000 and 8100 in the UNCTAD TRAINS 
database, which is the source of the NTB indicators. 
 
26 Leamer’s (1990) method is as follows. First, imports are predicted using factor endowments. Then the 
impact of NTBs on imports is measured as deviations of imports, in the presence of NTMs, from these 
predicted values. Finally, this quantity impact of NTMs on imports is converted into a price equivalent (or 
AVE) by using the import demand elasticities estimated in Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004). 
 
27 The source of the dollar value of agriculture domestic subsidies is Ng and Olarreaga (2004), obtained 
from WTO members’ notifications during 1999.  The method of computing the AVE of domestic support 
is to treat them as NTMs and apply the same method as for Core NTMs. Production subsidies vary widely 
in their uses and aims. They include direct payments to producers (such as deficiency payments), input 
subsidies (on irrigation water, for example), policies that distort market prices (market price supports), 
and interest subsidies on commodity loan programs. Also included in these measures are the “boxed” 
policies demarcated in the Uruguay round. These include direct payments and price support benefits that 
directly influence production (“amber box”), payments tied to limits on production (“blue box” policies), 
research, domestic food aid, environmental programs, and certain crop insurance and income safety net 
programs (“green box” policies).  
 
28 The main source of the ad valorem tariff data is the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB).  
Specific (dollar/unit) tariffs can be converted to their ad valorem equivalents by dividing the specific 
tariff by the unit value of the imported product. The International Trade Commission (ITC) provides the 





(before the Doha round), they are imposed largely unilaterally.  Agricultural tariff data are 
therefore appropriate for testing the Grossman-Helpman model.   
 
The subsidy measures are taken from Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga.
29  Unlike the protection 
measures, the closest we can get to an ad valorem equivalent is the ratio of the dollar value of the 
subsidy to the dollar value of exports.  Two subsidy measures are available, export subsidies as a 
proportion of exports, XS, and total subsidies (including production and export subsidies) as a 
proportion of exports, TS.
30 All protection and subsidy data are for the year 1999.   
 
Trade and Output  
The USDA’s Production, Supply and Distribution database PSD Online (at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/complete_files/default.asp) is the source for trade and production 
data.  The data are kept at a commodity level that map neatly into the harmonized system (HS) of 
trade data-keeping at the 4-digit or 5-digit level. Since imports and production are both measured 
in physical units in the database, they yield precise measures of the inverse import-to-output (z
M) 
and inverse export-to-output ratios (z
X).   
 
We use the following criteria to categorize commodities as pure import or pure export goods: if 
for any commodity z
M>30 (imports small relative to output) and z
X<30 then it is categorized as a 
pure export good;  if for a commodity z
X>30 (exports small relative to output) and  z
M<30 then it 
is categorized as a pure import good.  In the data, in sectors where one ratio is greater than the 
cutoff of 30, the other is considerably less than 30, so that the cutoff clearly separates the 
exported commodities from import-competing ones.
31  
 
                                                 
29 Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004). 
 
30 The range of included production subsidy measures can influence imports as well as exports -- 
production subsidies can curtail imports (by increasing domestic production) or promote exports (by 
lowering production costs).  For goods with one-way trade (goods that are purely exported or imported), it 
is clear what the subsidies achieve.  For goods with two-way trade, we solve the problem by replicating 
them in the sample -- once for imports, and once for exports. Protection data are used only with the 
imports sub-sample, while subsidy data are used only with the exports sub-sample.  
 
31 This applies to commodities with zero imports (so that z
M is infinite), and zero exports (z






M<30 then the sector is categorized as a two-way trade sector.  In the sample, 
they are replicated, once as an import good for which z
M is the relevant variable, and once as an 
export good for which z
X is relevant.  Thus, in the sample used to estimate (4), there are 94 
observations, 41 for imports and 53 for exports. 
 
Another study by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga estimates U.S. import demand elasticities at the 
tariff line level using the GDP function approach.
32 Since the import demand elasticity variable 
consists of estimated values, we treat it as a variable measured with error, but with known 
measurement error variances (equal to the square of their standard error of estimate).  A Fuller 
correction is applied to the variable before it is used as the denominator in the z/e variable.
33 
Corresponding estimates of export supply elasticities are unfortunately unavailable. Since most 
agricultural goods are relatively undifferentiated it is reasonable to assume that their export 
supplies are elastic. We therefore set the export supply elasticity equal to 2 for all goods. 
 
Lobbying  
Agricultural PAC spending data for the three congressional election cycles between 1993-1998 
were downloaded from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) website.
34  The main use to 
which the PAC spending data are put is to measure lobbying organization.
35 Whether a good i 
has political representation (Ii=1) or not (Ii=0) is determined on the basis of PAC spending 
summed over this period.  Goods are ordered by PAC spending and sets of I are defined, each set 
corresponding to a percentile cutoff value.  Models (4)-(6) are estimated using all these 
                                                 
32 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004a).  See e.g. Kohli (1991) for the GDP function method. In this method 
imports are treated as inputs into domestic production, given exogenous world prices, productivity and 
endowments. 
 
33  Fuller (1986). The idea behind this correction is to limit the influence of estimates that are large and 
also have large standard errors. Without the correction, these large estimates would grossly overstate the 
true elasticity.  The correction mutes their effect. 
 
34   www.fec.gov.  
 
35 Mapping PACs into SIC-based agriculture-related sectors was done via a concordance constructed by 
Beaulieu and Magee (2002). In most cases many PACs mapped into one SIC code, so SIC level 
contributions are simply the aggregate of the mapped PACs. For one-to-many maps, political 
contributions from each PAC were fractionally assigned equally to each SIC code into which the PAC 
mapped. To check for consistency we compared our data with the data on the opensecrets.com website.  




alternative I-sets in order to gauge the robustness of the results to measures of political 
organization.   
 
It is instructive to examine some features of PAC spending data, and assess whether they are in 
line with the Grossman-Helpman idea of money buying policy (as different from money buying 
mere access to policymakers).
36  Farm PACs contributed between $5.5 million and $7 million 
during each of the five election cycles. Among farm products, the most politically active were 
sugar PACs, dairy PACs and ranch PACs. Together these three PACS accounted for about 75% 
of total farm PAC contributions.
37  Over 200 PACs were politically active during this period. 
Cotton, dairy and wheat had the highest degree of PAC concentration, and represented by the 
equivalent of three or four equal sized PACs. Ranch, sugar, and fruits and vegetables were 
represented by the equivalent of eight to ten equal-sized PACs.
38  
 
PAC money is clearly influential in agriculture. A study of the 1985 and 1990 voting during 
sugar legislations by Brooks, Cameron and Carter finds that in the House and Senate both votes 
were responsive to sugar PAC contributions.
39  Further, the value of sugar production in their 
constituency also determined how congresspersons voted.  Sugar lobbies also targeted candidates 
that were likely to advance pro-sugar policies.  
 
Two-thirds of agricultural PAC money went to House candidates and one-third to Senate 
candidates. Figure 1 indicates the top 20 recipients in the House of agriculture PAC contributions 
during the 1993-94 election cycle.
40 During this cycle, 13 of the top 20 House recipients of 
                                                 
36 Gawande (2006) details the structure of lobbying in agriculture over the 1990-2000 period in the United 
States. 
 
37 Food manufacturing PACs, forestry and nursery PACs, agriculture service PACs and agriculture 
distribution PACs contributed more than did farm PACs. 
 
38 Based on Herfindahl indices computed by the authors.  
 
39 Brooks, Cameron and Carter (1998). Lopez (2001) also finds that PAC contributions influenced 
agricultural policies in other sectors. 
 
40 The PAC data are in three relational data files: candidate information files (CN), PAC committee 
information files (CM), and files containing transactions between PACs and candidates (PAS).  For each 




agricultural PAC money were members of the influential House Agricultural committee. They 
included the committee chair (de la Garza ) and three subcommittee chairs (Stenholm, Rose, 
Volkmer). Figure 2 bears out much the same story for the 1997-98 election cycle. The pattern of 
giving in these figures clearly indicates that agricultural PACs targeted politicians with influence 
over agriculture policy.  The amounts are not inconsequential. For example, in the 1993-94 
cycle, agricultural PACs delivered between 8% (Fazio) and 60% (de la Garza) of the total PAC 
money received by the top twenty “Ag PAC” recipients.
41   
 
Instrumental Variables 
Since the regressor is composed of the endogenous variables I and z we construct two exogenous 
variables from the agriculture census of 1997 that identify each of the endogenous variables.  
The first instrument, termed PaymentConcentration, is a measure of geographic concentration 
and pressure. It is constructed using data on total government payments available for each state.  
Total government payment to a state is then distributed across the top four commodities 
produced in that state.
42  This approximates how much each commodity gets by virtue of its 
being a visible top four commodity in the state. Summing across the states gives us variable 
PaymentConcentration which measures government payments to each visible commodity.  The 
second instrumental variable termed Farmland is simply the acres of land in farms for each crop.  
The first variable is constructed in order to identify political organization and the second to 
identify the output-to-imports and output-to-exports ratio z.  Since the regressor in model (4) is a 
composite of the two, for identification we use linear, quadratic, and cross-product of these two 
variables as our set of instruments. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
files, and then merged with the relevant cycle’s CN  files. Agriculture committee and sub-committee 
assignments for each Congress were obtained from Congressional Quarterly (1996-1999).  
 
41 Top 20 list-makers who were not on the Agricultural committee represented districts with influential 
agricultural constituents (CA, OK, VA, MI). For example, Fazio’s district (CA, district 3) was among the 
30 leading districts by market value of agricultural products (1997 Census of Agriculture). 
 
42 These include payments for acreage reductions, commodity credit loans, payments for meeting 




5.   Empirical Analysis 
Results 
The first set of results we discuss are estimates of model (4) using the sample of 94 observations 
in which both import-competing and exported goods are stacked. Each row in Table 2 contains 
estimates of β1 from seven specifications of model (4). Each specification uses a different 
definition of political organization, Ii. Their purpose is two-fold.  First, contributions do not 
necessarily imply that a particular commodity is politically represented in the trade arena, the 
relevant policy domain for the Grossman-Helpman model.  Agricultural producers have 
historically benefited from a basket of instruments such as acreage controls in addition to trade 
protection and subsidies.
43  To the extent that PAC contributions are directed not only at trade-
related instruments, a single contributions-based definition may mismeasure Ii. Second, a range 
of measures of political organization makes the results consistent with a broad set of beliefs, and 
also conveys the robustness of the results to different measures of political organization.   
 
Each of the six rows in Table 2 defines the dependent variable differently. The first two rows use 
the {Core NTM, Subsidy} combination for the dependent variable, that is, for import-competing 
goods protection is measured as Core NTMs while for exported goods subsidies are measured as 
export subsidies (row 1) or total subsidies (row 2).  The next two rows use the {Overall 
Protection, Subsidy} combination, and the final two rows use the {Tariff, Subsidy} combination.  
A diverse range of instruments is thus represented in Table 2, allowing for a more inclusive test 
of the Grossman-Helpman model than previous tests that have used data only on imports.  
 
The 42 models in Table 2 are estimated using Kelejian’s two-stage least squares (2SLS) method 
(see Section 3), using as instruments the variables PaymentConcentration, Farmland, their 
squares and cross-products.  In the first model in Table 2, 90% of the sample is organized. The 
variable Ii equals 1 if total PAC spending over the 1993-98 period for sector i is ranked above the 
bottom tenth percentile of the sample.  t-values are reported next to the estimates of β1.  Shaded 
t-values denote statistical significance for 1-tailed test. The signs and statistical significance on 
the estimates affirm the Grossman-Helpman prediction across all models, even those with few 
(though influential) politically organized sectors.  The positive and statistically significant 
                                                 




estimates of β1 demonstrate that political organization increases agricultural protection to import 
competing sectors and subsidies to exporting sectors according to their z/e ratio. For 
commodities whose producers are politically organized, the greater the stakes from protection 
(high output) and the lower the deadweight loss from protection (low imports, low e), the greater 
is the difference between domestic and world prices.   
 
A change in z/e in an organized industry changes the level of protection/subsidy by β1>0. For 
example, the middle two rows of Table 2 indicate that an increase in the output-to-import or 
output-to-export ratio by 100 would increase the dependent variable in (4) by anywhere between 
18% and 24%.
44  This translates into an increase in the price received by the domestic producer 
by approximately 19% to 26% at the sample mean (of 0.082).
45  Since it is highly likely that 
between 10% and 80% of the commodities (more precisely, observations in the sample) are 
actually organized those estimates capture reality. 
 
Quantitatively, the results echo a puzzling finding from previous examinations of the Grossman-
Helpman model that used manufacturing data.  Inverting the coefficient estimate yields estimates 
of the government preference parameter a. These implied estimates are skewed towards welfare. 
The last two columns of Table 2 indicate that, across the models, the implied estimates of a lies 
between 47.6 and 62.5 when the dependent variable is the {Core NTM, Export subsidy/Total 
subsidy} combination, between 41.7 and 55.6 with the {Overall Protection, Export subsidy/Total 
subsidy} combination, and between 83.3 and 100 with the {Tariff, Export subsidy/Total 
subsidy} combination.  They show that government places far greater weight on a dollar of 
welfare, at least 40 times as much, as on a dollar contributed politically.   
 
The first robustness test we undertake is with respect to the validity of the five instruments used 
in the first stage. The set of instruments pass the Sargan test of overidentification, that is, the 
                                                 
44 In the cross section, due to wide disparities in the z/e ratios, differences of that magnitude are not 
uncommon. 
 
45 A one percent change in the dependent variable in (4), g/(1+g), translates into a (1+g) percent raise in 






instruments prove to be exogenous and uncorrelated with the errors in the structural equation.  
But that in itself is not sufficient to guarantee reliable inferences in small samples if instruments 
are “weak”.  Intuitively, when instruments are only weakly related to the endogenous regressor, 
then t-tests based on conventional asymptotic approximations can be quite inaccurate.  Stock and 
Yogo show that, with five instruments, the first-stage F-statistic must be greater than 6.40 in 
order for the bias of the 2SLS estimator relative to the (large sample) bias of the OLS estimator 
to be lower than 20%.
46  Table A1 in the appendix shows that except for the models with I10 and 
I80, the first stage F-statistics are greater than 6.40, and the 2SLS estimates are significant 
improvements over their OLS counterparts.  Even so, it is worth investigating whether the more 
robust limited information likelihood estimators (LIML) change the inferences significantly.  
Table 3 presents the LIML estimates of the parameter β1.  As the last two columns indicate, the 
estimates do not significantly lower the estimates of the preference parameter a.  They continue 
to show that the U.S. government places at least 40 times as much weight on a dollar of welfare 
as on a dollar of lobbying money.   
 
A second set of robustness tests is based upon new political organization variables constructed 
by predicting PAC spending from a linear regression with the output-to-import or output-to-
export ratio z as the regressor. This method yields better measures of trade-related lobbying than 
using the raw lobbying data.  Table 4 presents results using these measures. The variable I is now 
based on percentile cutoffs using the predicted value of PAC spending.  The results prove robust 
to these new variables.  The last two columns of Table 4 indicate somewhat larger implied 
estimates of a when the dependent variable is the {Core NTM, Export subsidy/Total subsidy} or 
{Overall Protection, Export subsidy/Total subsidy}, and a somewhat smaller estimate with the 
{Tariff, Export subsidy/Total subsidy} combination.  They show that government places at least 
55.6 times (and as much as 83.3) as much weight on a dollar of welfare as on a dollar of 
contributions.  
 
Does splitting the sample separately into import-competing and exporting goods alter the 
magnitudes of the a estimates?  This is the third set of robustness tests we undertake. Table 5 
presents LIML estimates from the imports samples, where the dependent variables are measures 
                                                 




of protection.  The first stage F-statistics (see Table A2) lie between 4 and 5 for the imports 
sample, so that LIML proves to be the more robust estimator for this sample.  The last two 
columns indicate that the preference parameter a lies between 20.8 (Overall protection model) 
and 62.5 (All tariff model) across the three measures and the variety of I measures – a relatively 
smaller range of estimates than with the full sample, but not significantly so.   
 
Table 6 presents LIML estimates from the exports sample, where the dependent variables are the 
two subsidy measures.  The first stage F-statistics (see Table A3) range from a low of 0.54 
(model with I80) to a high of 5.27 (model with I60). The LIML estimator is therefore robust to 
the weak instrument problem for only models with intermediate measures of political 
organization.  Therefore the lower limit of the a estimates (which come from the model with I80) 
are quite unreliable.  It would be safest to infer that a exceeds 100 (and is less than 250) from the 
subsidy data.  The results are therefore quite robust to differential rates of tradeoff between 
lobbying contributions and welfare that may characterize U.S. government preferences across 
policy instruments. 
 
The main implication from the estimates of the preference parameter a in Tables 2-6 is that the 
observed values of z/e and their interactions with I can only lead to the observed levels of NTB 
protection and subsidies if government puts great weight on welfare.  That is, the U.S. 
government is approximately a welfare maximizer. But welfare maximization would lead to free 
trade, and trade in agriculture is by no means free! The deadweight losses from protection are 
considerable.  Table 7 compiled from Hufbauer, Elliott, and Schott, indicates the extent of those 
losses from protection in U.S. agricultural products.
47 They estimate the annual deadweight 
losses from protection due to sugar quotas during 1977-84 to be $540 mn., due to Section 22 
protection of dairy products in 1983 to be $1.6 bn., due to peanut quotas in 1983 to be $14 mn., 
due to voluntary export restraints of meat in 1983 to be $280 mn., and due to a policy to extend 
the fish conservation zone further out to sea to be $185 mn. On the subsidy side, Friedman 
estimates the deadweight losses from grain crop subsidies in 2002 to be between $2 to $6 billion 
                                                 






48  The distortion in agricultural prices is substantial. To conclude that the large 
values of a inferred from estimates of the Grossman-Helpman model require us to reject the role 
of politics in agricultural trade policy would be simplistic at best and a misrepresentation of the 
results at worst.   
 
How is one to resolve this paradoxical finding about a?  We start by exploring the idea that the 
large estimates of a are a consequence of the model’s assumption that contributions are far 
larger in magnitude than they actually are.  As described in Section 3, in order to induce 
government to implement a policy, the change in contributions from any lobby due to a small 
change in policy must, at the margin, compensate the government an amount equal to a times the 
loss in consumer welfare plus (in the case of a single lobby, and more if there is lobbying 
competition; see fn 6).
49  But if deadweight losses are as large as the estimates in Table A1 (and 
those in Friedman) indicate, then according to the lobbying side of the Grossman-Helpman 
model the estimates of a imply that we should observe lobbying spending in the billions of 
dollars! We thus term this puzzle the “case of the missing contributions”. 
 
Reconciling the results: Lobbying under policy uncertainty  
In order to resolve the puzzle, we amend the theory to make it capable of generating the real 
world lobbying and protection data.  A contribution of this paper is to bring the model closer to 
legislative reality.  The Grossman-Helpman model presumes government to be a singular entity 
with the power to supply protection with certainty. In reality the legislative process leading to 
protection is uncertain.  First, contributions are made ex ante to the award of protection or 
subsidy.  They are not, as in the Grossman-Helpman model, made upon delivery of protection or 
subsidy. Second, lobbies make contributions to a number of political agents who, neither 
individually nor collectively, can guarantee a specific outcome like the unitary government of 
Grossman-Helpman can.  The legislative studies literature has rejected the “straw man” unitary 
                                                 
48 Friedman (2003) estimates are based on the following calculation: In 1995, total receipts for the grain 
crops were in the $40 to $50 billion range. Approximately 41.9 percent of these receipts come from direct 
or indirect government support, implying total transfers in the $17 to $21 billion range. The deadweight 
losses various studies have cited for different commodity programs are in the range of 10 to 30 percent of 
transfer payments, which is $1.7 to $6.1 billion for the grains. 
 





government hypothesis.  A voluminous literature in this area seeks to understand the 
complexities of the legislative process. Not only can a potential policy be stillborn as it fails in 
committee, in the chambers, or is vetoed by the executive, but even if it makes it through, its 
shape may be indelibly and unpredictably altered as it encounters gatekeepers, opportunists 
(“log-rollers”), and legislators with the power and influence to form deal-breaking coalitions at 
various stages of its journey.  Legislative uncertainty is in fact the norm for trade policy owing to 
its essentially redistributive nature that creates gainers and losers.  For example, the 1989 Trade 
Omnibus bill was characterized by logrolls, mark-ups, and an executive veto before a much 
milder and less protectionist form of legislation was passed by Congress.   
 
Thus, protection is for sale, but uncertainly, since lobbying contributions are made in advance of 
knowing the outcome.  Specifically, unlike the GH model in which the government is promised a 
contribution j
i t C by lobby i for every possible tariff 
j
i t , j=1,…,∞, and collects from lobby i its 
promised contribution *
i t C after delivering a particular policy 
*
i t ,
50 in reality each lobby must 
make a contribution knowing only that a policy 
j
i t can be delivered only uncertainly. For 
simplicity, let us characterize this legislative uncertainty using a probability parameter γ.  
Lobbies know that each and every policy vector (of tariffs) is supplied with probability γ, and 
denied with probability (1- γ).  Then (assuming risk-neutrality on the part of lobbies), lobby i 
will set its contribution j
i t C for the particular tariff 
j
i t  at the level at which it maximizes the 




                                                 
50 A specific policy here is a vector of tariffs and subsidies across all goods, where, under the assumption 
that a negligible proportion of the population is organized, each lobby is concerned about only that 
element of the vector pertaining to its own sector, that is, its own tariff/subsidy. 
 
51 In order to understand this more formally, compare the maximization of the joint government-lobby i 
net welfare function under certainty about policy versus uncertainty.  The former is given in fn. 7 as 
G+Wi− Ci where Wi− Ci is the welfare of lobby i net of its contributions. Under uncertainty, where the 
government can deliver a tariff ti with probability γ, the joint net welfare function becomes G+γWi− Ci, 
since ex ante to the policy lobby i can only maximize expected welfare.  Applying the first order 
condition for a maximum to the joint net welfare under uncertainty now determines the optimal political-
economic tariff in sector i as the first equation in (3), and the optimal export subsidy as to the second 


























































,  if i’s  producers  export.      (7) 
  
The parameter γ sharply differentiates the equilibrium in (7) from that in equation (2).  Under 
uncertainty, the political economy parameter a is retrieved as γ/β1 from the econometric model 
(3).  Thus, if γ=0.10, the estimate of parameter a drops to between 4 and 6, or one-tenth of the 
estimate under certainty (using LIML estimates in the first two rows of Table 3).  Bringing 
uncertainty about government’s ability to deliver policy into the Grossman-Helpman model thus 
brings many results into line with reasonable prior beliefs based on facts about (low) 
contributions and (large) deadweight losses. 
  
An intuitive approach to understand the mechanism that is altered by introducing policy 
uncertainty is to consider what happens to lobbying contributions.  Consider the instructive case 
of a single lobby which exists, say, in sector 1. As described in Section 3 (subsequent to equation 
(1)), under certainty the lobby presents the government with a menu of contributions in which it 
promises to pay the government a times the deadweight loss (DWL) for every possible tariff. 
This clearly overstates actual contributions in the real world.  Under uncertainty, the lobby pays 
the government (ex ante to the policy) an amount equal to a times γ times the deadweight loss 
(DWL) from the expected tariff.  For example, if contributors viewed the probability of 
protection to be 10%, then contributions in the same model would equal a time expected 
deadweight loss, or a×0.1×DWL.  The government receives far less in contributions than the 
deadweight losses its policies impose, since the contributions come ex ante to the policy.  The 
“case of the missing lobbying” thus stands resolved.
52   
                                                 
52 We can approach PAC spending formally. Consider the expression that approximates DWL in a sector 
(see e.g. Vousden, 1990):  
DWL/y ≈ 0.5× [t/(1+t)]
2 ×e/z,  
where y  is output (see fn. 27). Substituting for t/(1+t) from (2) yields  
DWL/y ≈ 0.5×[β1×z/e]
2 ×e/z  
= 0.5×1/a




Further, the actual level of protection to sector 1 is lower because contributions are lower. If 
contributions are thought of as being determined within the unitary government framework of 
Grossman and Helpman, when in reality they are determined ex ante to a policy that a divided 
government can only deliver with uncertainty, then the level of protection will be  (erroneously) 
predicted to be greater than it is in reality.  The result is that the unitary government model leads 
to the conclusion that the low tariffs are due to a welfare-loving government, when in reality it is 
a self-interested government that delivers tariffs in response to (lower) contributions under 
uncertainty.   
 
On the supply side, why should a mulit-layered government agree to provide redistributive 
policies to a handful of winners at a low price? To this question, we provide an intuitive answer 
but await more formal explanations from future research.  In the real world, in order to maximize 
the impact of their limited budgets (determined by the lobby upon their assessment of the policy 
uncertainty parameter γ) agricultural lobbies strategically target a handful of politicians, such as 
ranking members of the House and Senate agriculture committees.  Congresspersons on the 
agricultural committee are more than willing to bear their share of the deadweight loss from 
distortionary agricultural policy. It is clear from Figures 1 and 2 that representatives of 
agricultural constituencies vie for membership on agricultural committees so that not only are 
they able to influence policy to suit their constituencies but are also lobbied in the process.  
Formal extensions of the Grossman-Helpman theory in this direction should recognize the 
paramount importance of committees in legislative decisions.
53   
                                                                                                                                                             
a×DWL/y ≈ 0.5×1/a×z/e.  
In the single-lobby case described above, the numerator on the left hand side equals PAC spending in the 
Grossman-Helpman model, or 
PAC/y ≈ 0.5×1/a×z/e. 
Thus PAC spending by the industry’s lobby as a fraction of industry output is predicted by the Grossman-
Helpman model to be proportional to z/e, the factor of proportionality being (approximately) 0.5/a.  With 
legislative uncertainty, the mapping from DWL into z/e is modified as protection (an therefore) DWL 
becomes probabilistic in the eyes of the lobby.  Thus, if E(DWL)=γ×DWL, then 
a×E(DWL)/y ≈ 0.5×γ/a×(z/e),  
and thus 
PAC/y ≈ 0.5×γ/a×(z/e).  
Under uncertainty the model predicts that PAC spending as a fraction of output is proportional to (z/e) the 
factor of proportionality being (approximately) 0.5×γ/a.  
 





Once the issue leaves the committee for the floor, why should other congresspersons that bear 
the deadweight loss, but are not compensated by lobbies, care to vote for the distortionary 
policy? Distributional models of legislative organization recognize that legislators are a 
heterogeneous group and care differentially about different issues.
54 Mutual gains makes it 
almost necessary to trade votes across issues. In this view, agriculture committee members are 
supported in exchange for their reciprocal support on issues on which the agriculture committee 
members bear their portion of deadweight loss without being compensated.  Proof of vote trading 
in the U.S. congress and its quantitative importance is demonstrated by Stratmann.  Stratmann 
finds that vote trading among farm interests is widespread, and that such logrolling coalitions 
exhibited a strong degree of stability.
55  His analysis of logrolling during voting on the 1985 
Farm Bill shows strong evidence that legislators traded votes.
56  Moreover, legislators with 
intense preferences, such as members of the House agriculture committee, were the most likely 
to trade votes. 
 
It is appropriate at this stage to consider whether competing views about lobbying might not be 
more relevant than the Grossman-Helpman view of lobbying as exchange.  An alternate view is 
one where lobbying spending provides access to politicians.  This opens the door for lobbies to 
provide politicians with information that benefits them and simultaneously implies policies that 
benefit the lobbyist.
57  Hansen discusses milestones in agricultural policymaking during the 
twentieth century that he posits were due to informational lobbying.
58 Might not informational 
lobbying be a worthy alternative to the quid-pro-quo lobbying of the Grossman-Helpman model? 
                                                 
54 Martin and Simmons (1998). 
 
55 Stratmann (1995). 
 
56 Stratmann (1992). 
 
57 This theory was originally developed in Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963) and Millbraith (1960).  
 
58 Hansen (1991) finds that in the 1950s and 60s farm policy makers dropped the American Farm Bureau 
Federation (AFBF) from its dominant position in agricultural politics. AFBF had been agriculture’s 
leviathan for a generation.  In the 60s and the 70s commodity organizations replaced the position 
previously occupied by the AFBF. Also, in the 60s and the 70s farm policy makers paid less and less 
attention to the advice of farm lobbies. In the 70s and 80s, this was reversed, and they scarcely paid 




Evidence on the effectiveness of informational lobbying in agriculture is, at best, feeble. Wright 
finds only very weak evidence of informational lobbying of the House Agriculture committee, 
the most influential policymaking committee in agriculture.
59  He attributes the weak finding to 
the fact that the Agriculture committee deals with a narrow and well defined set of issues on a 
periodic basis (as different from Ways and Means which attacks a range of diverse issues, often 
on an ad hoc basis). Both, leaders and rank and file members of the Agriculture committee, have 
ample opportunity to regularly interact with lobbies.  The preferences of agricultural lobbies 
have been fairly constant over time, and so those preferences are well known to Agriculture 
committee members (in contrast to the Ways and Means Committee whose members encounter a 
wide range of lobbyists, many on an issue-by-issue basis, so that informational lobbying can be 
influential on the margin).  Hence, informational lobbying of Agriculture committee members is 
not influential on the margin in the formation of coalitions.  This view of Agriculture committee 
members possessing a strong continuing link with PACs whose preferences have been stable 
over time is endorsed in Parker and Parker.
60   Agriculture is distinguished among committees 
for the stability of their coalitions as issues move from committee to the floor. Parker and Parker 
take this to imply that the influence of special interests on forming preferences of committee 
members on these committees is strong.  In contrast, members of other committees often change 
their votes on the floor indicating that their preferences on committee were weak to begin with. 
 
Therefore, we do not see a role for informational lobbying in agriculture, at least over the short 
duration of a decade.  Our experiment is different from Hansen’s, who considers a longer period 
in history during which there were points in time when Congress sought new information from 
lobbies.  At those threshold points, informational lobbying may have led to marked shifts in how 
Congress began to view agricultural policy. On a continuing basis over the 1991-2000 period we 
                                                                                                                                                             
within the farm lobby, congress restricted access for the farm lobby but congress denied access to the 
consumer lobby. Hansen’s theory of these changes in access is developed around  (i) competitive 
advantage in a lobby’s ability to deliver better information to politicians than their rival groups, and (ii) 
recurrence of issues around which a lobby makes its case to the politicians. Hence, politicians grant 
access to lobbies on the basis of their informational advantage over other lobbies, and also the 
permanence of the issues and positions conveyed by the lobbies. 
 
59 Wright (1991). 
 




see little role for new information.  Our view is thus that agricultural PACs contributions are 
more in the spirit of exchange or payments in political markets for protection, as Grossman and 
Helpman posit.  With the “paradox of the high a” resolved, the amended and extended 
Grossman-Helpman model presents an emerging new paradigm in the literature on the political 
economy of trade policy. 
 
6.   Conclusion 
The theoretical lens of the Grossman-Helpman model is used in this paper to investigate the 
political economy of US agricultural protection and subsidies. Since the theory delivers clear 
empirical predictions about the structure of protection, empirical estimation of the determinants 
of protection and subsidies may be tightly linked to theory.  The model thus encourages 
structural econometric estimation of the political economic determinants of protection and 
subsidies.  This is in contrast to the ad hoc specifications in previous empirical, and, to be sure, 
not any less important, exploratory empirical work in this area. This is the first attempt at 
applying this model to study agricultural protection. Estimates from the model strongly affirm 
the qualitative implications of the Grossman-Helpman model.  They clearly establish that 
interest-group money bends agricultural policy in the U.S.   
 
Quantitatively, accepting the theory literally leads to the inferences that the U.S. government is a 
welfare maximizer.  This is inconsistent with the large estimates of deadweight losses from 
distortionary policy in agriculture, and the small amount of money contributions that are able to 
“buy” that policy.  We show that the puzzle is resolved by extending the model to allow 
uncertainty about the ability of politicians to deliver policy combined with the fact that 
contributions are made ex ante to the policy.  It makes common sense that lobbies, which must 
determine how much to contribute under uncertainty about the “product” they wish to purchase, 
contribute much less than in a world where there is no uncertainty.
61 
 
The results of the empirical estimation clearly reveal the government-business political nexus 
that underlies the equilibrium with agricultural protection. Making agricultural liberalizations the 
                                                 
61 Perhaps it is this uncertainty that forces them to try to gain access to policymakers to use forms of 




focus of the Doha round has caused the negotiations to stumble.  If this is a “crisis of 
multilateralism”,
62 is the mechanism described in the paper so prevalent across the world that it 
lies at the source of the crisis? Are more stable cooperative outcomes more possible on a bilateral 
basis?
63  Our results expose a powerful source of international fissures that have challenged 
current multilateral negotiations.   
 
Our resolution of the missing lobbying paradox also raises questions.  We close on the note that 
these may also be answered in future research.  What are realistic values of the uncertainty 
parameter γ? Should this parameter be modeled as being different for different sectors? Can 
structural models of policy uncertainty due to, for example, the existence of veto players
64 be 
incorporated to generate realistic hypotheses of not only the structure of protection and subsidies 
but also about to how such uncertainty conditions lobbying behavior?  
                                                 
62 Martin (1992). 
 
63 Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992; Paarlberg (1997). 
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Fi gure 2: Top 20 H0USE Reci pi ent s of  AG PAC m oney: 1997- 98 El ect i on Cycl e
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Notes:     1.  M sample has N=41, X sample has N=53, and combined sample has N=94. 
 2.  In=1 if total PAC spending during 1993-98 is greater than the nth percentile of the combined sample. 
  3.  Export supply elasticities unavailable. Set equal to 2. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.  Three samples: (1) Imported Goods, (2) Exported Goods, (3) M and X goods 
   Short Description  Description  mean  sd 
Core NTM  ad valorem equivalent of Core nontariff measures (NTM)  0.137 0.180 
Overall Protection  ad valorem equivalent of All NTMs  0.176 0.179 
All Tariff  ad valorem tariff + ad valorem equivalent of specific tariff  0.127 0.218 
z
M/e
M  (production/imports)/|import demand elasticity|  5.208 6.241 
z
M/e
M ×I10  (see def of In in the notes below)  4.564 6.381 
z
M/e
M ×I25   4.537 6.400 
z
M/e
M ×I33   4.537 6.400 
z
M/e
M ×I40   4.268 6.447 
z
M/e
M ×I50   4.072 6.511 
z
M/e
M ×I60   3.827 6.552 
z
M/e
M ×I80   2.999 6.430 








































Farmland  Farmland (billion acres)  0.109 0.120 
XS  export subsidy ($)/exports ($)  0.010 0.057 
TS XS+(production  subsidy/exports)  0.012 0.061 
z
X/e
X  (production/exports)/export supply elasticity  3.559 3.716 
z
X/e
X ×I10  z/e x I10  3.331 3.774 
z
X/e
X ×I25  z/e x I25  2.929 3.853 
z
X/e
X ×I33  z/e x I33  2.929 3.853 
z
X/e
X ×I40  z/e x I40  2.158 2.830 
z
X/e
X ×I50  z/e x I50  1.791 2.541 
z
X/e
X ×I60  z/e x I60  1.395 2.052 
z
X/e
X ×I80  z/e x I80  0.786 1.669 


























Farmland  Farmland (billion acres)  0.107 0.120 
{Core, XS}  Dependent variable measued as Core NTM if   0.066 0.140 
   observation is M and XS if observation is X       
{Core, TS}  {Core NTM, Total Subsidy} 0.066 0.141 
{Overall Protection, XS}  {All NTM + Tariff, Export Subsidy} 0.082 0.150 
{ Overall Protection, TS}  {All NTM + Tariff, Total Subsidy} 0.083 0.150 
{All Tariff, XS}  {All Tariff, Export Subsidy} 0.061 0.160 
{All Tariff, TS}  {All Tariff, Total Subsidy} 0.062 0.161 
z/e  z
X/e
X if in set of imports; z
X/e
X if in set of exports
  4.278 5.015 
z/e×I10   4.059 5.090 
z/e×I25   3.630 5.154 
z/e×I33   3.630 5.154 
z/e×I40   3.079 4.843 
z/e×I50   2.785 4.810 
z/e×I60   2.456 4.721 
z/e×I80   1.751 4.534 
z/e×I90   1.024 3.872 




















































Dependent variable coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t Min Max
{Core NTM, Export subsidy} 0.016 4.91 0.016 4.80 0.016 4.80 0.017 4.75 0.018 4.66 0.018 4.34 0.021 3.77 47.6 62.5
{Core NTM, Total subsidy} 0.016 4.93 0.016 4.82 0.016 4.82 0.017 4.77 0.018 4.67 0.018 4.37 0.021 3.79 47.6 62.5
{Overall Protection, Export subsidy} 0.018 5.34 0.018 5.05 0.018 5.05 0.020 4.97 0.020 4.84 0.020 4.50 0.024 3.94 41.7 55.6
{Overall Protection, Total subsidy} 0.018 5.35 0.019 5.06 0.019 5.06 0.020 4.99 0.020 4.86 0.020 4.52 0.024 3.96 41.7 55.6
{All Tariff, Export subsidy} 0.011 2.93 0.010 2.58 0.010 2.58 0.011 2.51 0.011 2.39 0.011 2.30 0.012 1.97 83.3 100.0
{All Tariff, Total subsidy} 0.011 2.96 0.010 2.60 0.010 2.60 0.011 2.55 0.011 2.43 0.011 2.34 0.012 2.00 83.3 100.0
Notes:
1.  N=94 in all models.
2. Dependent variable: {Y1,Y2} implies the dependent variable is measured as Y1 is the observation is an import good, and Y2 if it is an export good.
    See Table 1.
3. z/e defined as (production/imports)/|import demand elasticity| for imports set, and (production/exports)/export supply elasticity for exports set.
3. Shaded t-value cells denote statistical significance for right-tailed test: green at 1%, tan at 5% and yellow at 10%.
4. Five instruments used in the first stage: PaymentConcentration, Farmland, their squares and cross-product.
5. The a estimates obtained by inverting the coefficient estimates -- see eq.(4).
6. The Sargan overidentification test cannot be rejected at the 5% level in any model. That is, the instruments pass the exogeneity test.
z/e × I60 z/e × I80 estimates:
Table 2:  2SLS estimates of coefficient β1 [Equation (4)]
Regressor: Range  of  a
z/e × I10 z/e × I25 z/e × I33 z/e × I40 z/e × I50
 
Dependent variable coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t Min Max
{Core NTM, Export subsidy} 0.016 4.91 0.016 4.81 0.016 4.81 0.017 4.76 0.018 4.67 0.018 4.38 0.024 3.84 41.7 62.5
{Core NTM, Total subsidy} 0.016 4.93 0.016 4.82 0.016 4.82 0.018 4.78 0.018 4.69 0.019 4.41 0.024 3.86 41.7 62.5
{All NTM+Tar, Export subsidy} 0.018 5.34 0.019 5.07 0.019 5.07 0.020 4.99 0.021 4.86 0.021 4.55 0.028 4.00 35.7 55.6
{All NTM+Tar, Total subsidy} 0.019 5.36 0.019 5.08 0.019 5.08 0.021 5.01 0.021 4.88 0.022 4.57 0.029 4.02 34.5 52.6
{All Tariff, Export subsidy} 0.011 2.96 0.011 2.68 0.011 2.68 0.012 2.62 0.012 2.51 0.012 2.41 0.015 2.14 66.7 90.9
{All Tariff, Total subsidy} 0.011 3.00 0.011 2.72 0.011 2.72 0.012 2.66 0.012 2.55 0.012 2.46 0.015 2.18 66.7 90.9
Notes:
1. See Notes 1-5 in Table 2.
2. The Anderson-Rubin overidentification test cannot be rejected at the 5% level in any model. That is, the instruments pass the exogeneity test.
z/e × I60
Range of a
estimates: z/e × I80
Table 3:  Limited Information Maximum Information (LIML) estimates of coefficient β1 [Equation (4)]
Regressor: 




Dependent variable coef t coef t coef t coef t Min Max
{Core NTM, Export subsidy} 0.013 3.41 0.013 3.37 0.014 3.31 0.015 2.88 66.7 76.9
{Core NTM, Total subsidy} 0.014 3.39 0.014 3.35 0.015 3.25 0.015 2.73 66.7 71.4
{All NTM+Tar, Export subsidy} 0.015 3.67 0.015 3.62 0.016 3.51 0.017 3.02 58.8 66.7
{All NTM+Tar, Total subsidy} 0.016 3.72 0.016 3.67 0.017 3.55 0.018 3.06 55.6 62.5
{All Tariff, Export subsidy} 0.012 2.46 0.012 2.44 0.012 2.33 0.013 2.07 76.9 83.3
{All Tariff, Total subsidy} 0.012 2.52 0.012 2.50 0.013 2.38 0.013 2.13 76.9 83.3
Notes:
1.  N=94 in all models (see appendix Table A1.
2. The first two columns report estimates from models with all sectors organized.
3. See Notes 1-5 in Table 2.
Table 4:  LIML estimates β1 [Equation (4)]: Political Organization based on predicted PAC spending
Regressor: Range  of  a




Variable coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t Min Max
Core NTM 0.023 4.20 0.024 4.01 0.024 4.01 0.024 3.84 0.025 3.72 0.026 3.50 0.035 3.00 28.6 43.5
Overall Protection 0.031 4.68 0.031 4.31 0.031 4.31 0.032 4.12 0.033 3.94 0.035 3.69 0.048 3.08 20.8 32.3
All Tariff 0.016 2.44 0.016 2.26 0.016 2.26 0.016 2.20 0.016 2.11 0.016 2.04 0.021 1.92 47.6 62.5
Notes:
1.  N=41 in all models.
2. See Notes 2-5 in Table 2.






Table 5:  Limited Information Maximum Information (LIML) estimates of coefficient β2 [Equation (5)]














Variable coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t Min Max
XS 0.004 1.48 0.004 1.41 0.004 1.41 0.008 2.03 0.01 2.17 0.013 2.58 0.043 2.11 23.3 250.0
TS 0.005 1.52 0.005 1.44 0.005 1.44 0.009 2.05 0.011 2.20 0.014 2.60 0.046 2.13 21.7 200.0
Notes:
1.  N=41 in all models.
2. See Notes 2-5 in Table 2.
3. The Anderson-Rubin overidentification test cannot be rejected at the 5% level in any model. 
z
X/e
X × I60 z
X/e
X × I80 estimates:
Table 6:  Limited Information Maximum Information (LIML) estimates of coefficient β3 [Equation (6)]
Regressor: Range  of  a
z
X/e
X × I10 z
X/e
X × I25 z
X/e
X × I33 z
X/e
X × I40 z
X/e




Instruments z/e × I10 z/e × I25 z/e × I33 z/e × I40 z/e × I50 z/e × I60 z/e × I80
PaymentConcentration 3.548 3.849 3.849 5.373 5.471 6.394 3.005
(1.41) (1.57) (1.57) (2.38)** (2.47)** (3.00)*** (1.36)
Farmland -48.31 -56.13 -56.13 -53.52 -62.65 -61.12 -17.20
(2.20)** (2.63)** (2.63)** (2.73)*** (3.26)*** (3.30)*** (0.90)
PaymentConcentration squared 0.531 0.477 0.477 0.156 0.232 0.037 0.871
(0.66) (0.61) (0.61) (0.22) (0.33) (0.05) (1.24)
Farmland squared 155.38 171.37 171.37 179.96 220.04 225.35 63.28
(1.80)* (2.03)** (2.03)** (2.32)** (2.90)*** (3.08)*** (0.84)
PaymentConcentration* Farmland -16.03 -15.47 -15.47 -18.97 -22.83 -24.95 -18.24
(2.00)** (1.98)* (1.98)* (2.64)*** (3.25)*** (3.68)*** (2.60)**
constant 4.754 4.668 4.668 3.505 3.291 2.594 1.559
(6.47)*** (6.52)*** (6.52)*** (5.33)*** (5.11)*** (4.18)*** (2.43)**
N  94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R
2 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.27
First Stage F 5.47 7.28 7.28 8.47 9.19 10.19 6.35
Notes:
1. Absolute t-values in parentheses: *** denotes statistical significance at 1%,** at 5% and * at 10%.
2. See Table 1 for variable descriptions.
Dependent Variable (endogenous variable in the structural model):


















PaymentConcentration 8.012 9.154 9.154 9.792 10.05 10.623 5.79
(1.88)* (2.18)** (2.18)** (2.32)** (2.35)** (2.48)** (1.27)
Farmland 10.08 -34.54 -34.54 -28.84 -84.54 -79.29 13.36
(0.12) (0.43) (0.43) (0.36) (1.04) (0.97) (0.15)
PaymentConcentration squared -0.863 -1.033 -1.033 -1.169 -1.047 -1.169 -0.014
(0.72) (0.87) (0.87) (0.98) (0.87) (0.97) (0.01)
Farmland squared -70.86 98.87 98.87 85.97 305.33 293.34 -60.53
(0.22) (0.31) (0.31) (0.27) (0.95) (0.91) (0.18)
PaymentConcentration* Farmland -0.532 -13.59 -13.59 -13.89 -31.95 -32.21 -11.13
(0.02) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (1.15) (1.16) (0.38)
constant 4.003 4.215 4.215 3.57 4.22 3.633 1.884
(2.46)** (2.63)** (2.63)** (2.22)** (2.58)** (2.22)** (1.09)
N  41 41 41 41 41 41 41
R
2 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.31
First Stage F 4.15 4.72 4.72 4.83 4.69 4.80 3.13
Notes:
1. Absolute t-values in parentheses: *** denotes statistical significance at 1%,** at 5% and * at 10%.
2. See Table 1 for variable descriptions.
Table A2:  First Stage regressions (Sample of Imported goods)







X × I10 z
X/e
X × I25 z
X/e
X × I33 z
X/e
X × I40 z
X/e
X × I50 z
X/e
X × I60 z
X/e
X × I80
PaymentConcentration -2.333 -2.53 -2.53 0.004 0.007 1.354 1.11
(0.60) (0.68) (0.68) 0.00 0.00 (0.75) (0.63)
Farmland -30.18 -35.82 -35.82 -33.43 -41.73 -40.52 -2.93
(1.32) (1.64) (1.64) (2.09)** (2.97)*** (3.83)*** (0.28)
PaymentConcentration squared 2.089 2.357 2.357 1.594 2.237 1.814 -0.238
(0.67) (0.78) (0.78) (0.72) (1.16) (1.25) (0.17)
Farmland squared 76.96 78.26 78.26 93.73 136.23 144.24 1.20
(0.84) (0.89) (0.89) (1.45) (2.40)** (3.38)*** (0.03)
PaymentConcentration* Farmland -5.304 -4.005 -4.005 -8.178 -15.52 -17.602 -1.278
(0.33) (0.26) (0.26) (0.73) (1.57) (2.37)** (0.17)
constant 4.653 4.675 4.675 3.099 2.686 1.874 0.923
(5.95)*** (6.24)*** (6.24)*** (5.65)*** (5.58)*** (5.17)*** (2.58)**
N  53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R
2 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.36 0.05
First Stage F 1.27 2.71 2.71 2.78 3.36 5.27 0.54
Notes:
1. Absolute t-values in parentheses: *** denotes statistical significance at 1%,** at 5% and * at 10%.
2. See Table 1 for variable descriptions.
Table A3:  First Stage regressions (Export sample)
Dependent Variable (endogenous variable in the structural model):
 